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TEMPLEMIRE V. W&M WELDING: MISSOURI’S NEW STANDARD 
FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RETALIATION CLAIMS 
RETALIATES AGAINST STARE DECISIS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of stare decisis is the general policy of all courts to adhere to 
the ratio decidendi of prior cases decided by the highest court in a jurisdiction, 
as long as the principle derived therefrom is one that is still constant with 
reason.1 Stare decisis is also of crucial importance to American courts, as 
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor has stated that it promotes evenhandedness, 
predictability, and consistency in the legal system that fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions.2 
For over thirty years, Missouri courts have honored the principle of stare 
decisis in interpreting Missouri workers’ compensation laws.3 Since 1978, 
Missouri courts have held that for a plaintiff to win a workers’ compensation 
retaliation claim, the plaintiff had to show that the exercise of their rights was 
the exclusive cause of their firing.4 Decades of employers and employees have 
relied on the consistency of this standard. However, the exclusive causation 
standard and stare decisis were randomly disregarded in early 2014, as 
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. adopted the contributing standard for 
workers’ compensation retaliation claims.5 
To better understand the United States labor system, Part II of this 
Casenote reviews the history of employment-at-will in the United States. Part 
III discusses common law, federal, and Missouri state exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine, concluding with the workers’ compensation 
retaliation law that will be the focus of the remainder of this Casenote. Part IV 
reviews Missouri’s judicial and legislative history of the workers’ 
compensation retaliation laws and the dependence Missouri placed on the 
exclusive causation standard. Part V briefly discusses developments outside of 
workers’ compensation that the Templemire majority focused on in overturning 
 
 1. Frederick G. Kempin Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years 1800-1850, 3 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 28 (1959). 
 2. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013). 
 3. See generally Mitchell v. United States, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), Davis v. 
Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Hansome v. Northwestern 
Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984), and Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1998). 
 4. See generally Mitchel, 575 S.W.2d 815. 
 5. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014). 
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precedent. Part VI focuses on the Templemire decision and Part VII analyzes 
the decision and factors considered by both the majority and dissent of 
Templemire. 
This Casenote will discuss that factors such as judicial and legislative 
developments outside of workers’ compensation law do not offer a compelling 
reason to either uphold or repeal the exclusive causation standard in workers’ 
compensation laws. However, due to the fact that the Missouri General 
Assembly did not offer an explicit causation standard within the statute, it was 
the duty of Missouri courts to interpret the statute and then uphold that 
decision in accordance with stare decisis. This Casenote will therefore 
demonstrate Templemire’s disregard of over thirty years of precedent was 
unfounded, impulsive, and hypocritical. 
II.  HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
In nearly every jurisdiction in the United States, under the employment-at-
will doctrine, an employer can discharge an employee without notice or cause, 
unless an employment contract specifies otherwise.6 However, employment-at-
will was not always the governing doctrine. At English common law, where 
the parties did not specify the duration of employer, the law presumed the 
duration to last for one year.7 This presumption was based off the idea that 
injustice would result if masters could have the benefit of servants’ labor 
during planting and harvest seasons, but discharge them to avoid supporting 
them during the unproductive winter.8 A similar injustice would follow if 
servants who were supported during the hard season could leave their master 
when labor was most needed.9 However, this one-year presumption could be 
rebutted if facts, such as the customs of the industry or the length of pay 
periods, showed the parties held a different intent.10 
In the United States, English common law was largely followed, but the 
presumption of annual hiring was not generally adopted.11 By 1870, courts 
were confused, as some courts adopted the English presumption and others 
disregarded it.12 Thus, in 1877, a treatise writer, Horace Wood, developed a 
principle that would later be considered to be the source of the American 
employment-at-will rule.13 Wood’s principle stated that general or indefinite 
 
 6. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
118, 118 (1976). 
 7. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 J. BUS. L. 65, 66 (2013). 
 8. Feinman, supra note 6, at 120. 
 9. Feinman, supra note 6, at 120. 
 10. Summers, supra note 7, at 66. 
 11. Summers, supra note 7, at 66–67. 
 12. Summers, supra note 7, at 67. 
 13. Summers, supra note 7, at 67. 
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hiring would be considered to be at-will, unless a party could establish proof 
that stated otherwise.14 Thereby, Wood’s rule imposed a presumption that all 
hirings were at-will, not for one year.15 
Wood’s principle did not win immediate acceptance.16 However, in 1985, 
New York adopted Wood’s principle in Martin v. New York Life Insurance 
Co., by holding that an indefinite hiring was presumed to be a hiring at-will.17 
The New York Court of Appeals gave credibility to Wood’s principle, and by 
1930, it became embedded in American law.18 
With employment-at-will, employees were able to resign from positions 
they no longer cared to occupy and employers were permitted to discharge 
employees at their whim.19 However, this equal footing between employers 
and employees began to erode in the second half of the 20th century.20 Courts 
and legislatures began to recognize that employers often have advantages when 
negotiating with employees, and thus employees commonly feared being 
unable to protect their livelihood from unjust termination.21 
III.  EXCEPTIONS TO EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
A. Common Law Exceptions 
In the 1970s, courts were skeptical about the divine right of employers to 
fire employees at their will and began to limit the harshness of employment-at-
will.22 Thus, the courts created the three major common law exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine: the public policy exception, the implied-contract 
exception, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception.23 
The most widespread exception, the public policy exception, prevents 
terminations for reasons that violate a state’s public policy.24 Although the 
 
 14. Summers, supra note 7, at 67; Feinman, supra note 6, at 126. 
 15. Summers, supra note 7, at 67. 
 16. Summers, supra note 7, at 67. For example, in the 1891 case Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26 
N.W. 143, 145 (N.Y. 1891), the New York Court of Appeals applied the pay period presumption, 
stating: “In this country, at least, if a contract for hiring is at so much per month, it will readily be 
presumed that the hiring was by the month, even if nothing was said about the term of service.” 
However, this court would accept Wood’s principle four years later. 
 17. Feinman, supra note 6, at 128. 
 18. Summers, supra note 7, at 67–68. 
 19. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124 U.S. 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (2001). 
 20. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4. 
 21. Muhl, supra note 19, at 3–4. 
 22. Summers, supra note 7, at 70. 
 23. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4. 
 24. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4. Forty-three of the fifty states recognize the public policy 
exception. Furthermore, the public policy exception is the only common law exception 
recognized by Missouri. 
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definition of public policy varies from state to state, most states narrowly limit 
the definition to clear statements that can be found in the state’s constitution or 
statutes.25 However, seventeen states, including Missouri, enable judges to 
broadly define a state’s public policy, and are thus not confined by its 
constitution and statutes.26 Examples of the public policy exception include 
protection of employees who were discharged for serving on a jury, who 
refused to join in employer’s illegal practices, or who reported violations to 
public authorities.27 
Some states recognize an exception to employment-at-will where an 
implied contract is formed between an employer and employee even though no 
formal, expressly written instrument regarding the relationship exists.28 A 
common occurrence under this exception occurs when courts find that the 
contents of an employee handbook, such as statements that employees will be 
terminated only for “just cause,” create implied contracts.29 
The final judicial exception, the exception for a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, is only recognized by eleven states.30 By far the broadest of the 
common law exceptions, this exception reads a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing into every employment relationship.31 Therefore, employers in those 
states are held to a “just cause” standard and all terminations made in bad faith 
are prohibited.32 
B. Federal Exceptions33 
Statutory exceptions to employment-at-will are also commonplace.34 The 
1960s was an era that introduced major federal legislative protections for 
employees, starting with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which is applicable to employers with fifteen or more 
 
 25. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7. 
 26. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7. 
 27. Summer, supra note 7, at 70–71. 
 28. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7. Thirty-eight of the fifty states recognize an exception where 
an implied contract exists. Missouri is in the minority of states that does not recognize this 
exception. 
 29. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
 30. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10. 
 31. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10. 
 32. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10. 
 33. This Section seeks to outline major pieces of legislation that create exceptions to 
employment-at-will. This should not be interpreted as an exclusive list, but rather as one that 
highlights major legislation relevant to this Casenote. 
 34. Summers, supra note 7, at 77. 
 35. Muhl, supra note 19, at 3. 
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employees, protects employees against discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, national origin, sex, and religion.36 
In 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which 
applies to employers with twenty or more employees, was enacted to protect 
individuals forty years or older from employment discrimination based on 
age.37 The ADEA also mandates that it is unlawful to retaliate against an 
individual for opposing practices that discriminate based on age, filing a 
discrimination charge, or in any way participating in an investigation or 
proceeding under ADEA.38 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits 
employers with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against 
qualified individuals with disabilities.39 According to the ADA, an individual 
with a disability is a person who has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such 
impairment, or is regarded as having such impairment.40 Employers that 
qualify under that act are required to make a reasonable accommodation to the 
employee if it would not impose undue hardship on their business.41 
In 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) became applicable to 
private-section employers with fifty or more employees in twenty or more 
workweeks and all public agencies.42 The FMLA provides eligible employees 
up to twelve weeks unpaid leave for any twelve month period for reasons 
including the birth and care of a newborn child, caring for a spouse, child, or 
parent with a serious health condition, and taking medical leave when the 
employee faces a serious health condition.43 
Therefore, major federal exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine 
include prohibiting firing employees on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
 
 36. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., available at 
http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguidanc/pages/ti 
tleviiofthecivilrightsactof1964.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 37. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., 
available at http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguid 
anc/pages/agediscriminationinemploymentactof1967.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., 
available at http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguid 
anc/pages/americanswithdisabilitiesactof1990%28ada%29.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. Undue hardship is defined as an action that requires significant difficult or expense 
when considering the employer’s size, financial resources, and nature of operation. 
 42. Family and Medical Leave Act, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., available at 
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/fmlaleave%28withservicemember 
leaveexpansion%29.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 43. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
210 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:205 
sex, religion, age (if over forty years old), disabilities that do not cause undo 
hardship, and certain eligible leaves of absence under the FMLA. 
C. Missouri Exceptions44 
The Missouri legislature codified the federal legislation of Title VII, 
ADEA, and ADA, with minor changes, in the Missouri Human Rights Act 
(HMRA).45 The HMRA prohibits employment discrimination based on an 
individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, disability that 
does not cause employers undue hardship, or age (if between forty and sixty-
nine years old).46 The Missouri HMRA is applicable to any employer with six 
or more employees.47 Therefore, like in the federal statutes, Missouri 
recognizes exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine when employees are 
fired based on discrimination classified in any of the above-listed categories. 
Missouri also recognizes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
by prohibiting employers from terminating employees for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim.48 In Missouri, employers with five or more employees 
must carry insurance to pay for medical treatment and lost time benefits for 
those who are injured in the course of their employment.49 Section 287.780 of 
the Missouri Revised Statutes forbids employers from discharging or in any 
way discriminating against employees who exercise their rights to recover for 
their work injury or illness.50 Therefore, retaliation for workers’ compensation 
is a Missouri recognized exception to employment-at-will. 
Although the principle that employers may not retaliate against employees 
for exercising their rights under workers’ compensation laws seems 
straightforward, it has recently brought forward tremendous debate as the 
Missouri Supreme Court has struggled to maintain a standard by which an 
employee can win a claim against their employer for wrongful termination. 
 
 44. Again, this Casenote is focused on major Missouri statutory exceptions to employment-
at-will and the legislation discussed is in no way an exclusive list of protections provided to 
Missouri employees. 
 45. Discrimination in Employment, MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 
available at http://labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/Discrimination/employment (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014). 
 49. Facts for Injured Workers: Information about Workers’ Compensation in Missouri, 
DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at https://labor.mo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
pubs_forms/WC-101-AI.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 50. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014). 
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IV.  MISSOURI’S HISTORY OF RETALIATION FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
A. Missouri Courts 
In 1978, the Missouri Court of Appeals heard Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 
in which Mitchell alleged that she was discharged based upon her filing of a 
Chapter 287 workers’ compensation claim.51 Alternatively, St. Louis County 
cited excessive absenteeism as the reason for Mitchell’s discharge.52 For the 
six months preceding her discharge, Mitchell was absent seventy-six and a half 
hours of work, sixty-eight of which were attributed to her workers’ 
compensation injury.53 Mitchell conceded that she had also missed work for 
reasons unrelated to her injury, including missed bus connections, chills, sore 
throat, tooth extraction, bad weather, oversleeping, personal business, and 
gynecologist appointments.54 
The court interpreted Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 to say 
that a cause of action for retaliation for workers’ compensation lies only if an 
employee is discharged discriminatorily by reason of exercising his or her 
rights under the workers’ compensation law.55 The court reasoned that there is 
nothing within the workers’ compensation law indicating that an employee 
who has been injured and has returned to work may be absent repeatedly 
without penalty.56 Thus, the Missouri court established an exclusive causation 
test to determine whether an employee was terminated in retaliation for 
exercising her or her rights under workers’ compensation laws. 
In 1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals declined an invitation to overturn 
the standard articulated in Mitchell.57 In Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 
Davis was injured and attempted to return to work after receiving medical 
treatment.58 At a regular meeting, the Commissioners voted to terminate Davis, 
and therefore Davis filed a lawsuit against the defendant for retaliation.59 Davis 
urged the court to overturn Mitchell, and instead find that a claim under 
Section 287.780 is provable by inference premised by the fact that an 
employee was terminated after perusing their rights under workers’ 
compensation laws.60 
However, the court upheld Mitchell, concluding that under Section 
287.780, there must be a causal relationship between an employee exercising 
 
 51. Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 814–815. 
 55. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 58. Id. at 252–53. 
 59. Id. at 253. 
 60. Id. at 254. 
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her or her workers’ compensation rights and the employee’s discharge arising 
precisely from the employee’s exercise of those rights.61 The court declined to 
adopt a rule where a plaintiff would be relieved of the burden of showing that 
his or her discharge was the direct result of discrimination.62 Davis was unable 
to prove that his discharge was the result of his exercising his workers’ 
compensation rights. He could only show he was injured and was later 
discharged.63 
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the tests articulated in 
Mitchell and Davis in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.64 Hansome 
was injured in August 1977, received workers’ compensation, and then 
received a discharge letter in October 1977.65 A manager at Northwestern 
Cooperage told Hansome: “You got hurt on the job; you drew your Workers’ 
Compensation. . .and I feel I just can’t use any longer.”66 The Missouri 
Supreme Court adopted the standard articulated in Mitchell and Davis, and 
articulated a test that a plaintiff must be an employee of defendant before the 
injury, have exercised a right granted by Chapter 287, be discharged by their 
employer, and that there exist an exclusive causal relationship between 
plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions.67 Therefore, the Missouri Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court’s verdict for Hansome, holding that he was able to 
prove his burden under the exclusive causation standard.68 
Over a decade after Hansome, the Missouri Supreme Court again upheld 
the exclusive causation standard in Crabtree v. Bugby.69 Crabtree was injured 
at her job at Silver Maple Farms, received workers’ compensation, and 
returned to work eight months later.70 During Crabtree’s absence, Silver Maple 
Farms hired a new supervisor, who did not get along with Crabtree.71 Within 
an eight-day period, Crabtree received four disciplinary reports from her 
supervisor.72 Shortly thereafter, Crabtree was terminated and claimed that her 
termination was in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.73 
 
 61. Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 256. 
 64. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 (Mo. 1984). 
 65. Id. at 274. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 275. 
 68. Id. at 276. The Hansome case, besides being the first case in which the Missouri 
Supreme Court adopted the exclusive causation test, is also a case that illustrates that the 
exclusive causation test, though difficult, is attainable for employees. Hansome presented 
sufficient evidence of retaliation and was therefore successful in winning his case. 
 69. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71 (Mo. 1998). 
 70. Id. at 69. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court yet again upheld the exclusive causation 
standard.74 The court stressed that they should not lightly disturb their own 
precedent, stating that a possible disagreement by the current court with the 
statutory analysis of a predecessor court was not a satisfactory basis for 
violating the doctrine of stare decisis.75 The court firmly stated that if there 
was an injustice, it would be for them to abandon the requirement that the 
discharge be exclusively caused by the exercise of rights pursuant to the 
workers’ compensation law.76 
The court also noted their concern of the adoption of a less stringent law, 
stating that under a lesser standard, an employee who admittedly was fired for 
tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work would still be able to maintain 
a cause of action for discharge if the worker could persuade the fact-finder that 
one of the factors in their discharge was the exercise of rights under workers’ 
compensation laws.77 The court held that the purpose of the workers’ 
compensation law was to compensate workers for job-related injuries, not to 
insure job security, and concluded that the exclusive causation standard best 
served that purpose.78 
Therefore, the history of the court is clear. Beginning in Mitchell in 1978, 
and consistently through Crabtree in 1998, Missouri courts have upheld the 
exclusive causation standard.79 The court in Crabtree strongly emphasized the 
problems of a lower standard, namely that employees who are tardy, absent, or 
incompetent would still have a cause of action if they also had a filed workers’ 
compensation claim.80 Furthermore, the Crabtree decision clarified that the 
principle of stare decisis required the court to consistently apply the exclusive 
causation standard.81 
 
 74. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 75. Id. at 71–72. 
 76. Id. at 72. 
 77. Id. It should be noted that the concerns of the court here are very justified. The 
circumstances they are describing is the case that occurred in Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 
S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). There, Mitchell claimed workers’ compensation retaliation 
after she missed work for reasons unrelated to her injury, including missed bus connections, 
chills, sore throat, tooth extraction, bad weather, oversleeping, personal business, and 
gynecologist appointments. 
 78. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 79. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815; Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 80. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. 
 81. Id. at 71–72. 
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B. Missouri Legislature 
In 2005, the Missouri legislature enacted a comprehensive reform of 
Chapter 287.82 There were numerous revisions and additions to Chapter 287.83 
One amendment required work to be a prevailing factor rather than a 
substantial factor in causing the injury, meaning that employees had a higher 
burden of proving there was no other non-employment contributing factors to 
their injury.84 Another amendment required that the accidents be identifiable 
by time and place of occurrence, meaning that injuries caused by repetitive 
actions or motions overtime would be excluded from workers’ compensation.85 
However, in the numerous amendments that the 2005 Missouri legislature 
passed, the General Assembly did not discuss or in any way change the long-
standing test of exclusive causation for retaliation cases.86 
V.  DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Two cases arose in 2007 and 2010, which although seemingly unrelated to 
workers’ compensation and lawsuits for retaliation for workers’ compensation, 
would come to have a large impact on workers’ compensation lawsuits. 
First, in 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court heard Daugherty v. City of Md. 
Heights. In Daugherty, a fifty-nine-year-old police captain was terminated, and 
had evidence that the city administrator was attempting to terminate employees 
over the age of fifty-five because their salaries were costly to the city.87 
Daugherty brought suit under the MHRA, which is an exception to 
employment-at-will doctrine, as it prohibits termination under many 
categories, including age if between the years of forty and sixty-nine.88 
The Missouri Supreme Court noted that nothing in the statutory language 
of the MHRA required a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial 
or determining factor in an employment decision.89 Therefore, the court 
interpreted the language of the MHRA to require a contributing factor 
standard, meaning that plaintiffs only had to show that consideration of age (or 
 
 82. Patrick J. Platter, History, Administration, and Jurisdiction, in WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mobarcle.org/bookstore/chapters/ 
wc.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 83. See generally BRIAN STOKES, Selected Issues in Workers’ Compensation Law: 2005 
Changes in the Law, THE STOKES LAW OFFICE, available at http://brianstokeslaw.com/index. 
php/refernce-information/211-2005-changes-to-worker-compensation-law (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015). 
 84. N. Drew Kemp, Note, Exclusively Confusing: Who Has Jurisdiction to Determine 
Jurisdiction Under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law?, 78 MO L. REV. 897, 904 (2013). 
 85. Kemp, supra. 
 86. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 389–90 (Mo. 2014). 
 87. Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 816–17 (Mo. 2007). 
 88. Id. at 816; Discrimination in Employment, supra note 45. 
 89. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 819. 
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other protected characteristics) contributed to their unfair treatment.90 The 
court did not in any way discuss workers’ compensation within the Daugherty 
opinion. 
Second, in 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court heard Fleshner v. Pepose 
Vision Inst., which discussed the public policy exception to employment-at-
will.91 Fleshner received a telephone call from the United States Department of 
Labor, who was investigating Pepose Vision to determine whether or not they 
failed to pay employees for overtime.92 Fleshner complied with the investigator 
and was terminated after reporting the call to her supervisor.93 As Fleshner was 
the first time in which Missouri recognized the public policy exception to 
employment-at-will, the Missouri Supreme Court had to decide whether the 
casual standard for public policy exceptions should be the exclusive causation 
standard that was articulated in retaliation for workers’ compensation cases.94 
The court decided to reject the exclusive causation standard for cases of 
public policy and instead adopted a contributing factor standard, similar to the 
Daugherty standard.95 The Missouri Supreme Court clarified that although 
exclusive causation was not the proper standard for wrongful discharge on 
public policy exceptions to employment-at-will, it was the appropriate standard 
for cases asserting retaliation from workers’ compensation.96 Therefore, while 
adopting a different standard for public-policy exceptions, in 2010, the 
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the long-existing exclusive causation standard 
for workers’ compensation retaliation cases.97 
 
 90. Id. In fact, the Daugherty decision upholds stare decisis, as it cites many cases in its 
reasoning for explicitly adopting contributing factor. In Midstate Oil Co. Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on 
Human Rights, the court looked to whether a defendant’s conduct was “motivated” by an 
invidious purpose. Midstate Oil Co. Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845 
(Mo. 2004). In McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., the court stated that given the similarity between 
the definition of “motivating” and “contributing,” they were not persuaded that motivating factor 
is a higher threshold than contributing factor, and held that under the MHRA plaintiffs only 
needed to demonstrate that discrimination was a contributing factor in the employment decision. 
McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 207 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) 
 91. Muhl, supra note 19 at 4; Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 91 (Mo. 
2010). 
 92. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 86. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 92. 
 95. Id. at 93–94. 
 96. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93. 
 97. Id. 
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VI.  TEMPLEMIRE CHANGES EVERYTHING 
A. Majority 
In 2014, Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. uprooted nearly thirty-five 
years of precedent when the Missouri Supreme Court suddenly decided to 
change the causal standard for workers’ compensation cases. In January 2006, 
Templemire was injured when a large metal beam fell from a forklift and 
crushed his foot.98 He was cleared to return to work about a month later on 
light duty and W&M Welding accommodated Templemire by creating light 
duty assignments for him.99 In November 2006, on the day in question, the 
defendant received a request to have a railing washed and picked up.100 
There are two different narratives of what occurred next. According to 
W&M Welding, Templemire was directed to wash the railing immediately, but 
two hours later the railing was still unwashed and Templemire was taking a 
break.101 W&M Welding claimed that Templemire stated that he was taking a 
break for his foot and if the owner did not like it, he could take it up with 
Templemire’s physician.102 Templemire was then fired for insubordination.103 
However, Templemire stated that he was told the railing would not be 
ready until later in the afternoon.104 Templemire claimed that as he went 
towards the wash bay to wash the railing, he stopped to rest his infected foot 
and was then confronted by the owner of W&M Welding.105 Templemire 
asserted that he tried to explain the events, but was discharged immediately.106 
In his lawsuit, Templemire, like many previous plaintiffs, petitioned the 
court to change the causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation 
cases to contributing factor instead of exclusive causation.107 The court 
discussed the previous history of retaliation for workers’ compensation. They 
noted Mitchell, where the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that a cause of 
action existed only if an employee was discharged by reason of exercising his 
or her rights under the workers’ compensation laws.108 The court also 
discussed the opinion in Davis, which stated that an employee’s discharge by 
his employer must arise precisely from the employee’s exercise of his or her 
 
 98. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014). 
 99. Id. at 373–74. 
 100. Id. at 374. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374–75. 
 103. Id. at 375. 
 104. Id. at 374. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376. 
 108. Id. at 377 (citing Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815). 
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rights, and therefore employees must prove a causal relationship between their 
discharge and the exercise of his or her rights.109 
The court also recognized the test that it made years prior in Hansome, that 
the plaintiff must have had status as employee before the injury, have exercised 
his or her rights granted under Chapter 287, be discharged by their employer, 
and that an exclusive causal connection must exist between plaintiff’s actions 
and defendant’s actions.110 Furthermore, the court noted its decision in 
Crabtree, which stated that exclusive causation should remain the standard 
because the court should not lightly disturb its own precedent and mere 
disagreement by the current court would not be a satisfactory basis for 
violating stare decisis.111 
However, the Missouri Supreme Court then stated that their recent decision 
in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst. questioned Hansome and its progeny.112 The 
court held that after thirty-five years of precedent, they would disregard the 
exclusive causation standard and would adopt the contributing factor standard 
for workers’ compensation retaliation cases.113 
The majority looked to the language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
287.780, which states: “No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way 
discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his or her rights under 
this chapter.”114 The court stated that because the language uses the phrase “in 
any way” the legislature clearly intended the application of a contributing 
factor standard and this standard better fulfilled the purpose of the statute.115 
The court did not find it persuasive that in 2005 the Missouri General 
Assembly failed to articulate a new standard for workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases.116 They classified the 2005 reform as inaction, which could 
not be interpreted to be approval of the court’s reading of a statute.117 
Regarding to the doctrine of stare decisis, the court noted that although the 
doctrine promotes security in the law, adherence to precedent is not 
absolute.118 The court stated that where it appears that an opinion is clearly 
erroneous and manifestly wrong, the rule of stare decisis is never applied to 
 
 109. Id. (citing Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255). 
 110. Id. at 377–378 (citing Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275). 
 111. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72). 
 112. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378. 
 113. Id. at 384. 
 114. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2014). 
 115. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
 116. Id. at 380. 
 117. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380, (citing Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 
S.W.3d 333, 334, 335 (Mo. 2005)). 
 118. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379 (citing Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence 
Sch. Dist. 223 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Mo. 2007); Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334–35). 
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prevent the repudiation of such a decision.119 Then, without much discussion, 
the court held that its own rulings in Hansome and Crabtree were clearly 
erroneous and thus stare decisis would not be applicable to workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases.120 
B. Dissent 
The dissent in Templemire criticized many aspects of the majority’s 
decision. First, the dissent objected to the majority’s application of Fleshner.121 
The majority held that the decision in Fleshner supports abandoning the 
exclusive cause standard established in Hansome and Crabtree.122 However, in 
examining the Fleshner opinion, the dissent noted that Fleshner rules on the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, not to workers’ 
compensation retaliation claims.123 The dissent emphasized that the holdings in 
Hansome and Crabtree were not based on judicially created common law 
doctrine, as was Fleshner’s interpretations on public policy.124 Rather, 
Hansome and Crabtree were interpretations of a Missouri statute on which the 
General Assembly is presumed to rely and to which the court should give the 
greatest deference to stare decisis.125 
Next, the dissent stated that there was a strong argument of legislative 
reliance on Hansome and Crabtree.126 In 2005, the General Assembly 
overhauled the workers’ compensation laws, and the dissent argued that the 
legislature took affirmative steps to retain the exclusive causation standard for 
workers’ compensation retaliation claims.127 While the General Assembly 
expressly abrogated prior cases of the Missouri Supreme Court by name and 
citation, they did not in any way mention the decisions in Hansome and 
Crabtree.128 Unlike the majority, the dissent believed the amendments were 
significantly more than legislative inaction.129 The dissent reasoned that the 
 
 119. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379 (citing Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc. 365 S.W.2d 
539, 546 (Mo. 1963)). 
 120. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380. In a footnote, the court indulges in a slippery-slope line 
of reasoning that strict adherence to stare decisis would result in a society that separated 
schoolchildren on the “separate but equal” doctrine that prohibited interracial marriage and that 
forbade women from serving on juries; Id. at 380 n.90. Indeed, these evils needed to be corrected, 
but the court fails to articulate a principled framework for determining when stare decisis should 
be abandoned. 
 121. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389. 
 122. Id. at 378, 389. 
 123. Id. at 389. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390. 
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legislature’s decision not to repeal the exclusive causation standard was the 
General Assembly’s affirmative support of the exclusive causation standard.130 
Finally and most importantly, the dissent strongly stressed the importance 
of stare decisis, stating: “What makes this country’s legal system the envy of 
the modern democratic world, and what sets it apart from most others, is the 
reliability of the outcome of cases based on the doctrine of stare decisis.”131 
The dissent noted the decision in Crabtree, which stressed that the court should 
not lightly disturb its own precedent due to mere disagreement by the current 
court with the analysis of a predecessor court.132 The dissent stated that, in the 
sixteen years since Crabtree, nothing has changed within the court other than 
its membership.133 The dissent stressed that the doctrine of stare decisis has 
little practical or intellectual value if all it takes to change the law was the 
passage of time and court membership.134 
Therefore, due to the distinction between workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases and public policy exception cases, the legislature’s decision 
not to abrogate the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases, and the doctrine of stare decisis, the dissent wholeheartedly 
rebuked the majority’s divergence from the exclusive causation standard. 
VII.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Effect of Fleshner on Templemire 
In Templemire, the court disagreed on the effect that Fleshner should have 
upon workers’ compensation retaliation cases. The majority stated that 
workers’ compensation retaliation case law remained unquestioned until the 
decision reached in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute.135 The court held that 
there can be no tolerance for employment discrimination in the workplace, be 
it based upon protected classes such as gender, race, or age [Daugherty], or an 
employee blowing the whistle on an employer’s illegal practices in violation of 
public policy [Fleshner], or for exercising workers’ compensation rights.136 
However, the dissent disagreed completely with the majority’s analysis.137 
The dissent noted a key distinction between public policy claims and workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases, namely that public policy termination claims 
arise under the common law of torts.138 The dissent stated that the holdings in 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 386. 
 132. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71). 
 133. Id. at 386–87. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 378. 
 136. Id. at 384. 
 137. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389. 
 138. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93). 
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Hansome and Crabtree were not based on judicially created common law 
doctrine, nor were they interpretations of an infrequently amended state 
constitution, but rather were interpretations of a Missouri statute, on which the 
General assembly is presumed to rely.”139 
As the dissent noted, a distinction between Fleshner and the workers’ 
compensation retaliation case history is that Fleshner discussed public policy, 
a common law principle, while workers’ compensation is a statutory 
provision.140 However, it is worth noting that the contributory factor standard 
used in public policy exceptions, as articulated in Fleshner, is also used for the 
statutory provision of the MHRA in Daugherty.141 As both the MHRA and 
workers’ compensation retaliation laws are statutory, the question arises as to 
whether both should follow the same standard. The answer clearly must be no, 
as it would be ridiculous to argue that all statutes must uphold the same 
causation standard. Rather, in their analysis, the court in Fleshner and the 
dissent in Templemire simply noted that Fleshner’s articulation of a 
contributing factor standard for public policy decisions in no way requires the 
court to do the same for statutory workers’ compensation laws.142 
Therefore, what effect Fleshner should have on workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases is easily debatable. The text of Fleshner appears to affirm the 
decisions in Hansome and Crabtree, as it states: “There is a key distinction 
between workers’ compensation retaliation cases and public-policy exception 
cases. While prior cases indicate that ‘exclusive causation’ is the appropriate 
standard for retaliation, [it] is not the proper standard for wrongful discharge 
based on the public-policy exception.”143 
However, it is possible that the Fleshner decision may have questioned the 
application of the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases. The majority noted that after Fleshner, it seemed nonsensical 
that the exercise of workers’ compensation rights not be afforded the same 
level of protection as the activities protected by the MHRA and public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.144 This principle is reflected in 
the majority’s statement that discrimination cannot be tolerated for 
discrimination based upon protected classes, an employee blowing the whistle 
on an employer’s illegal practices, or for exercising workers’ compensation 
 
 139. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389. 
 140. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93. The Fleshner Court stated that “[t]here is a key distinction 
between workers’ compensation retaliation cases and public-policy exception cases. Workers’ 
compensation cases arise under statute, while public policy exception cases arise under the 
common law of torts.” 
 141. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820; Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 94–95. 
 142. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93). 
 143. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93. 
 144. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
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rights.145 Therefore, although the words of Fleshner could be interpreted to 
affirm the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation, it could 
also be interpreted that the deeper meaning of Fleshner in fact does the 
opposite.146 
The impact of Fleshner on the workers’ compensation retaliation cases is 
argued well by both the majority and the dissent of Templemire. It is difficult 
to critique the majority for reading Fleshner in terms of its practical 
application, rather than the text used. However, the same cannot be said for the 
interpretation of the language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 as 
well as the majority’s disregard of stare decisis. 
B. The Missouri Legislature 
The language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 as well as the 
General Assembly’s intentions during the 2005 are both highly contested in the 
Templemire decision. Although it can be said that the majority and dissent are 
justified in their interpretations of the 2005 amendments of the Missouri 
legislature, the Templemire majority is cleared flawed in their interpretation of 
Section 287.780. 
The intent of the Missouri General Assembly during the 2005 overhaul of 
workers’ compensation law is easily debatable.147 The majority stressed the 
fallacy in relying upon legislative inaction, holding that inaction could be 
interpreted to be approval of a court’s reading of a statute, but could just as 
well mean that the forces in favor of changing the law are matched by the 
forces against changing it.148 Therefore, the majority concluded it would be 
merely speculative to infer the Missouri General Assembly’s approval of the 
exclusive causation standard through their decision not to revise Section 
287.780.149 
The majority has support in former Missouri Supreme Court case law, 
namely in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue. Here, as the majority 
stated, the court held that legislative inaction could simply mean that the forces 
arrayed in favor of changing the law were matched by the forces against 
changing it.150 The court stressed that an incorrect judicial interpretation of a 
statute could stand simply because the legislature paid no attention to it.151 
Although it seems unlikely that the legislature did not pay attention to Section 
287.780 during their expansive overhaul of workers’ compensation laws, the 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93; Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
 147. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380. 
 148. Id. (citing Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334. 
 151. Id. 
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precedent of Med. Shoppe makes it clear that the General Assembly’s inaction 
cannot be interpreted to be approval of the court’s reading of a statute.152 
The dissent, unlike the majority, found great significance in the actions of 
the 2005 General Assembly.153 What the majority classified as legislative 
inaction, the dissent interpreted as affirmative steps that demonstrated the 
legislature’s intent to retain the exclusive causation standard.154 The dissent 
found it significant that the legislature performed an extreme overhaul on the 
workers’ compensation laws, that repealed different causation standards and 
cases of Missouri courts by name and citation, but did not repeal the exclusive 
causation standard articled in Hansome and Crabtree.155 The legislature could 
have easily enacted a new causation standard for workers’ compensation 
retaliation cases by mention of Hansome and Crabtree, but did not.156 
Therefore, due to the extreme nature of the General Assembly’s overhaul, the 
dissent viewed the 2005 amendments as a powerful statement, rather than 
inaction.157 
The dissent’s argument is also supported by Missouri case law. In 1976, 
the Missouri Supreme Court held: “In construing statutes to ascertain 
legislative intent, it is presumed the legislature is aware of the interpretation of 
existing statutes. . .”158 Therefore, re-enactment of a statute after judicial 
construction is equivalent to legislative adoption of such construction.159 Under 
this interpretation, the 2005 amendments are the legislature’s adoption of the 
exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation cases, not 
what the majority classifies as legislative inaction. 
In viewing the arguments to the 2005 amendments, both the majority and 
dissent have arguments rooted in Missouri Supreme Court precedent.160 It is 
difficult to say which precedent is better and therefore both have valid 
arguments to the interpretation of the 2005 amendments of the Missouri 
General Assembly. However, the majority does not have a similarly valid 
argument in discussing their interpretation of the language of Section 287.780. 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389. 
 154. Id. at 390. 
 155. Id. at 389–90. 
 156. Id. at 390. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Kilbane v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. 1976) (affirming the 
rule stated in Gross v. Merchants-Produce Bank, 390 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)). 
 159. Dow Chemical Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 834 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1992). 
In Dow, the court explains it is not just the text of a statute that indicates legislative intent; 
judicial decisions also give effect to the statute. The judicial construction of a statute by a court of 
last resort becomes a part of the statute as if it had been so amended by the legislature. 
 160. The majority’s precedent is found in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 
S.W.3d 333, 334 (Mo. 2005). The dissent has precedent rooted in Kilbane, 544 S.W.2d at 11 
(Mo. 1976) and Dow Chemical Co., 834 S.W.2d at 745 (Mo. 1992). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] TEMPLEMIRE V. W&M WELDING 223 
Regarding to the language of Section 287.780, the majority stated that a 
contributory factor standard fulfills the purpose of the statute, which is to 
prohibit employers from discharging or in any way discriminating against an 
employee for exercising his or her rights under Chapter 287.161 The majority 
held that the use of the phrase, “in any way,” is more consistent with a 
contributory factor standard than an exclusive causation standard.162 However, 
the majority does not in any way support this assertion; they simply stated that 
a contributing factor standard better fulfills the “in any way” language of the 
statute and criticized the Hansome court for plucking the exclusive causation 
language “out of thin air.”163 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s opinion that the court in 
Hansome did not interpret the wording of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
287.780.164 The dissent made the obvious conclusion that the text of Section 
287.780 did not provide any specific causation standard, and thus the court had 
to analyze how to enact Section 287.780.165 Indeed, Hansome quoted Section 
287.780 and interpreted the four elements necessary to make a claim under the 
statute.166 The dissent stated that there can be no doubt that, in Hansome, the 
court was required to and did in fact construe Section 287.780.167 
Furthermore, Hansome cited Davis and Mitchell as precedent that aided in 
the interpretation of Section 287.780. Specifically, the Davis court concluded 
that Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 showed legislative intent that 
an employee must prove that they were discriminated against or discharged 
precisely due to the exercise of his or her workers’ compensation rights.168 The 
court reasoned that the wording of Section 287.780, which states that 
employers shall not discharge or discriminate for exercising their rights under 
Chapter 287, does not reflect that a cause of action exists due to the mere fact 
that an employee was discharged after they exercised their workers’ 
compensation rights.169 
In interpreting the text of Section 287.780, the dissent’s argument clearly 
outweighs the majority’s opinion. The majority stated that a contributory factor 
standard better fulfills the purpose of the statute due to the language of “in any 
way” located in Section 287.780.170 However, the words “contributing factor” 
 
 161. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 379, 384. 
 164. Id. at 389. 
 165. Id. The dissent indicates that the use of the language “in any way” is not indicative of 
any standard, but is simply part of the language used to prohibit workplace discrimination. 
 166. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
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much like the words “exclusive causation” do not appear anywhere in Section 
287.780.171 Therefore, the majority’s reading of Section 287.780 is their 
interpretation, much like exclusive causation standard, was the interpretation of 
the previous Missouri Supreme Court Justices. The majority’s interpretation 
cannot be said to be any better or worse than the decision of previous Missouri 
courts and thus cannot possibly justify overruling over three decades of 
precedent.172 
C. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Arguably, what should determine the outcome of Templemire is whether 
stare decisis should stand and preserve the exclusive causation standard. The 
Templemire majority noted that the doctrine of stare decisis promotes security 
in the law by encouraging adherence to previously decided cases, but also 
stated that adherence to precedent is not absolute.173 Indeed, the Missouri 
Supreme Court had stated previously in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. that the 
adherence to precedent is not absolute, that the passage of time and the 
expertise of enforcing a purportedly incorrect precedent may demonstrate a 
compelling case for changing course.174 
The Med Shoppe court noted that the changing needs of society could 
trump adherence to precedent and demonstrate the fallacy of an earlier 
interpretation.175 However, the failure of the Templemire majority is that they 
in no way discussed how needs of society have changed between the decisions 
in Crabtree and Templemire that would require such disregard to stare 
decisis.176 Instead, they bluntly stated that Hansome’s decision was unfounded 
and end the discussion on stare decisis.177 
Although not discussed by the Templemire majority, the Fleshner court 
possibly discussed a need of society that could justify the overturning of the 
doctrine of stare decisis.178 There, the court stated that the exclusive causation 
standard was difficult on employees because the employer could assert that the 
employee was also fired for another reason.179 Although this is a valid concern, 
 
 171. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014). 
 172. See discussion infra Section VII-C. 
 173. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379. 
 174. Med. Shoppe, 156, S.W.3d at 335. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80. 
 177. Id. at 379. As discussed infra Section VII-B, Hansome’s decision cannot be said to be 
unfounded, but rather is a valid interpretation of Section 287.780 that relies on previous case law 
to support its decision. 
 178. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93. 
 179. Id. Here, the Fleshner court was discussing why “exclusive causation” was not 
appropriate for public policy exceptions to employment-at-will and was not discussing workers’ 
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it cannot be said to be a new concern faced by the court, but instead is one that 
the courts in Mitchell, Davis, Hansome, and Crabtree had to consider years 
ago in establishing the exclusive causation standard. 
In a footnote, the Templemire majority stated that strict adherence to stare 
decisis would result in a society where discrimination would subject children 
to being segregated into schools that were purportedly separate but equal, 
where women could not serve on juries, and where interracial marriage would 
be subject to criminal prosecution.180 Indeed, it can be said that these notions 
are manifestly wrong. What is unclear is whether a high causation standard for 
employees asserting workers’ compensation retaliation cases could be said to 
be equivocally wrong to the aforementioned evils. The majority appears to use 
injustices that previously plagued society to stir emotions and gain support for 
their holding without discussing in any way how the exclusive causation 
standard for workers’ compensation is similar to those events. Rather, through 
little discussion, the court simply stated that stare decisis was best not applied 
to the exclusive causation standard.181 
Alternatively, the dissent noted that other than the passage of time and the 
changing membership of the court there were no reasons, no recent changes of 
society, and no inherent flaws in the exclusive causation standard that would 
require an abandonment of stare decisis.182 The dissent admonished the 
majority opinion for giving “short shrift” to the doctrine of stare decisis, 
claiming the majority failed to recognize that adherence to precedent is most 
important when the precedent in question concerns settled opinions of statutory 
interpretation.183 
Specifically, the dissent stressed the Missouri Supreme Court’s own 
decision in Crabtree, which explicitly said that [the Missouri Supreme Court] 
should not lightly disturb its own precedent and that mere disagreement by the 
current court would not be a satisfactory basis for violating the doctrine of 
stare decisis in the absence of recurring injustice or absurd results.184 The 
question then remains as to whether recurring injustice or absurd results were 
met by the exclusive causation standard. The court in Crabtree and the dissent 
in Templemire, among others, did not believe the exclusive causation standard 
reached the extreme classification of “absurd results.”185 
 
compensation retaliation cases. However, it would be an argument that could possibility apply to 
workers’ compensation retaliation cases as well. 
 180. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380. 
 181. Id. at 379. 
 182. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386–87. 
 183. Id. at 386. 
 184. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72). 
 185. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386–87 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72). It should be 
noted, the Court in Crabtree stated that the “absurd result” would be for the court to not uphold 
the exclusive causation standard. The court wrote: “If there is an injustice or an absurdity, it 
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Particularly, there are two United States Supreme Court Justices that would 
arguably agree with the Crabtree court and Templemire dissent. In Alleyne v. 
United States, United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor wrote: 
“Establishing that a decision was wrong does not, without more, justify 
overruling it.”186 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that courts should adhere to prior 
decisions, even if their soundness is questionable, because doing so promotes 
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles 
and fosters reliance on judicial decisions.187 Therefore, the question in 
Templemire, as it was in Alleyene, should be whether any special justification 
existed to justify departure from the important doctrine of stare decisis. The 
Templemire majority classified the exclusive causation standard described in 
Crabtree and Hansome as “an aberration. . .plucked out of thin air,” but still 
did not state any special justification that would require departing from stare 
decisis.188 Therefore, it seems likely that Justice Sotomayor would agree with 
the dissent that the doctrine of stare decisis should be upheld in Templemire. 
Secondly, in 1932, United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis stated: 
“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. 
This is commonly true even when the error is a matter of serious concern, 
provided correction can be had by legislation.”189 In his statement, Justice 
Brandeis indicated that stare decisis should be strictly upheld for decisions that 
concern statutory interpretation, as the legislature has the ability to correct an 
improper interpretation.190 Whereas cases involving issues such as the United 
States Constitution, which cannot easily be corrected through legislative 
 
would be for this Court to abandon the requirement that the discharge be exclusively caused by 
the exercise of rights pursuant to the workers’ compensation law. Under that rule, an employee 
who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work would still be able 
to maintain a cause of action for discharge if, in addition to the other causes, a cause for discharge 
was the exercise of rights under the workers’ compensation laws”. 
 186. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 
(2013)). 
 187. Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
 188. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379. 
 189. Id. at 387 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)). 
 190. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405–06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’ opinion has not 
gone unrecognized. In 1990, the Supreme Court expressly adopted Brandeis’ statements in 
Burnet, and refused to depart from precedent regarding to the interpretation of a statute in 
California v. F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. 490, 500 (1990). The Court reaffirmed this interpretation again 
in 2008, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 138, 139 (2008). 
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action, courts may be more lenient with the doctrine, as there is no other 
available avenue to correct a previously wrong decision.191 
Therefore, even if a special justification Justice Sotomayor discusses in 
Alleyene could be asserted by the Templemire majority in overruling the 
exclusive causation standard,192 there is still a strong argument for upholding 
the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation 
cases.193 The exclusive causation standard articulated in Hansome and 
Crabtree are statutory interpretations of the language of Missouri Revised 
Statutes Section 287.780.194 Therefore, according to Justice Brandeis and the 
dissent of Templemire, stare decisis should be given great effect for workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases.195 Indeed, as Justice Brandeis predicted, the 
Missouri General Assembly did in fact have the opportunity to change the law 
and the exclusive causation standard in 2005, but neglected to do so.196 Thus, 
the statutory interpretation of the exclusive causation standard for workers’ 
compensation retaliation laws should be upheld.197 
Of all the arguments present in the Templemire decision, the strongest 
argument for upholding the exclusive causation standard is one that is merely 
brushed over by the majority.198 The majority ironically called Hansome “an 
aberration, in which the ‘exclusive’ language appears to be plucked out of thin 
air with no support in the case law or statutory interpretation.”199 However, in 
their disregard for stare decisis, it is the majority who seems to be plucking the 
contributing factor standard out of thin air, as there are no previous workers’ 
compensation retaliation cases nor explicit wording in a Missouri statute to 
support its implementation.200 Therefore, it can only be said that the majority 
disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis and disposed of three decades worth 
 
 191. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (Brandeis J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis states: “In cases 
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically 
impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions. . .” 
 192. As detailed infra Section VI, it appears that no special justification exists. The majority 
opinion in Templemire finds it necessary to overrule the exclusive causation standard, and yet 
does not give any special justification other than its finding that the exclusive causation standard 
was arbitrarily selected by the court in Hansome and Crabtree. 
 193. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406. 
 194. See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) and Crabtree 
v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1998). 
 195. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 196. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389–390; see also STOKES, supra note 83 (outlining many of 
the changes made to workers’ compensation laws in the 2005 amendments). 
 197. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 198. A small section of the Templemire majority opinion is dedicated to the discussion of 
stare decisis. The court’s main reasoning for doing away with stare decisis is that the Hansome 
decision’s reliance on Mitchell and Davis was unfounded. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80. 
 199. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379. 
 200. See discussion infra Section IV of the history of workers’ compensation retaliation cases. 
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of precedent for what appears to be nothing more than mere disapproval of the 
previous courts’ interpretation.201 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Templemire decision created historic changes in Missouri workers’ 
compensation law. The decision significantly improved discharged and injured 
employees’ chances of winning a case against their employer by reducing the 
standard from exclusive causation to contributing factor. Some welcomed the 
new contributing factor standard as giving employees a “realistic chance” of 
recovering damages.”202 Others note the discussion in Crabtree, that a lower 
standard for workers’ compensation retaliation would result in an employee, 
who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work, 
being able to maintain a cause of action for discharge if, in addition to the 
above causes, [they exercised a right] under the workers’ compensation 
laws.203 
Aside from the more practical aspects of the change from exclusive 
causation standard to contributing factor standard, Templemire should cause 
great concern over the status of stare decisis in Missouri. With minimal 
discussion and unclear reasoning, the Missouri Supreme Court threw away 
over three decades worth of precedent in three paragraphs of a decision in 
Templemire.204 The Templemire majority, who criticized prior courts as having 
plucked the exclusive causation test out of thin air, did exactly what they 
condoned when they disregarded precedent and created the contributing factor 
standard– a standard that is in no way stated in Section 287.780 of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes.205 
Stare decisis is a foundation of the law of the United States, which as 
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor stated in Alleyene, promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles and 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions.206 However, if the Missouri Supreme 
Court can be so hypocritical and inconsistent with decades worth of precedent, 
then what are the people of Missouri supposed to rely on? If long-standing 
 
 201. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379. 
 202. MATTHEW SIMS, Missouri Workers’ Compensation: Wrongful Termination- Fired After 
Making a Claim for Benefits, THE SIMS LAW FIRM, availble at http://www.simslaw.com/missour 
i-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-fired-making-claim-benefits/ (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015). 
 203. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. Again, note this situation occurred in Mitchell, as Mitchell 
was fired for absenteeism that resulted from missed bus connections, bad weather, family illness, 
oversleeping, and gynecological appoints. However, because she also missed work for reasons 
related to her back injury, her employer would now be forbidden from firing her. 
 204. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80. 
 205. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80; MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014). 
 206. Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013). 
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laws can be disregarded with such little deliberations, Missouri citizens should 
be very weary to depend on the rulings of courts in their state. 
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